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Arbitration, Consent and Contractual
Theory: The Implications of
EEOC v. Waffle House
Jaime Dodge Byrnes & Elizabeth Pollman
EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002).
Consent has long been the foundation of arbitration, giving the
process legitimacy and informing decisions about its nature and
structure. The Supreme Court has consistently required consent as a
precondition for compelling arbitration. However, it remains unclear
what actions constitute consent. In First Options v. Kaplan,' the Supreme Court held that courts should apply state contract law to determine whether an arbitral clause exists, but "added an important
qualification" that "[c]ourts should not assume that the parties have
agreed to arbitrate unless there is clear and unmistakable evidence
that they did so."2
In the wake of First Options, the courts of appeals have compelled arbitration by non-signatories, applying both state contract
law and the pro-arbitration mandate of the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA"). 3 This trend of compelling arbitration by non-signatories 4 is
in tension with the traditional notion that arbitration should be
based upon direct consent by the parties. The Supreme Court had
5
historically refused to grant certiorari to resolve this conflict.
1. 514 U.S. 938 (1995).
2. Id. at 944.
3. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2003).
4. As will be discussed in Part II, infra, while a circuit split exists regarding
particular contractual theories, every circuit has continued to compel some arbitration by non-signatories.
5. See generallyDayhoff Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1996)
(holding that non-signatory parent corporations cannot "by reason of their corporate
relationship" enforce an arbitration clause signed by a wholly-owned subsidiary, absent an express agreement to that effect), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1028 (1996); Sunkist
Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757 (11th Cir. 1993) (compelling arbitration under a theory of equitable estoppel where signatory was acquired by
a corporation that assumed all the signatory's obligations), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869
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In its 2002 term, the Court accepted its first case, EEOC v. Waffle House,6 that directly addressed when a non-signatory may be required to arbitrate. The Court held that if a non-party has not
consented to arbitration, it could not be compelled to arbitrate its
claim. The holding reinforced First Options and clarified that its protections reach non-parties, which was consistent with the Court's tendency toward a strict construction of consent for determinations of
arbitrability. Nonetheless, the Court's minimal attention to the issue
in Waffle House may not have provided sufficient guidance to judges
attempting to reconcile the federal pro-arbitration policy, the application of contractual theory, and the consent requirement. As a result,
lower courts could conceivably continue to compel arbitration by relying on state contract law even in the absence of real consent, thereby
contravening the most fundamental principle of arbitration.
Part I of this Note describes the facts, procedural history and
holding of Waffle House. Part II then explores the current non-signatory jurisprudence through an examination of the five state law bases
for compelling arbitration by a non-signatory. Part III assesses the
relative merits of opposing arguments about whether Waffle House
has or has not precluded these theories for requiring non-signatories
to arbitrate. Part IV concludes that the court has limited, but not
completely precluded, the expansion of binding arbitration to nonsignatories.
I.
A.

Facts and ProceduralHistory

In August 1994, Eric Baker signed an employment application
containing a mandatory arbitration agreement at a Waffle House restaurant in South Carolina. After Baker suffered a seizure at work
approximately two weeks after starting employment, Waffle House
fired him7 with a notice stating, "[w]e decided that for [Baker's] benefit and safety and Waffle House it would be best he not work any
more." Baker did not initiate arbitration but instead filed a charge
(1994); Gvozdenovic v. United Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1991) (as-

sumption by conduct sufficient), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 910 (1991); Interocean Shipping Co. v. Nat'l Shipping & Training Corp., 523 F.2d 527, 539 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding
that an altei ego of the signatory may be obligated to arbitrate, but that this obligation is significantly limited), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
6. 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
7. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 193 F.3d 805, 807 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd 534
U.S. 279 (2002).
8. Id.
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of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that his termination violated the Americans
9
with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").
After an investigation and an unsuccessful conciliation effort, the
EEOC filed an enforcement action pursuant to the ADA and the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 against Waffle House in the Federal District Court
of South Carolina. 10 The EEOC alleged that Waffle House had engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of the ADA by
terminating Baker because of his disability. 1 The agency requested
permanent injunctive relief and victim-specific relief, including compensation, reinstatement, and punitive damages. 12 In response, Waffle House petitioned to compel arbitration under the FAA and to stay
the litigation or, alternatively, to dismiss the action under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).1 3 The district court found that the
arbitration clause was not binding because Baker had signed the employment agreement at a location different from where he worked
14
and therefore denied the motions.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that Baker's arbitration
agreement with Waffle House did not preclude the EEOC from seeking injunctive relief, but did preclude the EEOC from pursuing victim-specific relief on Baker's behalf.1 5 Although the court recognized
the EEOC was not a party to the agreement and that Title VII provides it independent statutory authority, it nevertheless determined
that permitting the EEOC to prosecute the claim on Baker's behalf
would undermine the "competing federal policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements."' 6 To protect the FAA's goals, the
9. See id.

10. The EEOC's action was pursuant to section 107(a) of the ADA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 12117(a) (2003), and section 102 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a
(2003). Baker was not a named party to the suit. Id.
11. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 807.
12. See id. at 807-08.
13. See id. at 808.
14. See id. The district court held that the arbitration agreement Baker had
signed was not binding because Baker had submitted the application to a different
Waffle House facility than the one that employed him. The court found that the Waffle House facility Baker went to work for had not hired him pursuant to the prior
application. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., No. CIV.A.3:96-2739-0, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23245, at *6 (D. S.C. Mar. 20, 1998).
15. See Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 808-09. The Court of Appeals found the arbitration agreement binding; that Baker had not signed the employment application at
the facility where he ultimately worked was "immaterial." Id. at 808. Baker had
signed a "generic, corporation-wide employment application [that] followed Baker to
whichever facility of Waffle House hired him." Id.
16. Id. at 812.
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Fourth Circuit distinguished the interests represented when the
EEOC seeks victim-specific relief, where the "EEOC's public interest
is minimal," from when the agency seeks broad injunctive relief in
17
the public interest.
B. Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court reversed by a 6-3 vote, rejecting the Fourth Circuit's decision to give effect to the FAA by compromising Title VII's authorization of the EEOC to seek victimspecific relief.' 8 Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens emphasized that the EEOC, as a non-party to the arbitration agreement,
could not be compelled to arbitrate under the FAA absent consent.19
1.

Title VII Analysis

The Court examined the EEOC's authority as codified in Title
VII and found that nothing in the statute suggests that a private arbitration agreement "materially changes the EEOC's statutory function or the remedies that are otherwise available." 20 The Title VII
amendments specify only the judicial districts in which Title VII actions may be brought without any reference to arbitration proceedings, 21 and nothing in the 1991 amendments to Title VII, which
expanded the relief under the Act to include compensatory and punitive damages for both private plaintiffs and the EEOC, suggests that
a private arbitration agreement would change the EEOC's statutory
function or the remedies available. 22 "[T]hese statutes unambiguously authorize" the EEOC to seek victim-specific relief on Baker's
behalf, as such relief was provided for in the amendments and there
23
was no mention of arbitration as a limiting factor.
17. Waffle House, 193 F.3d at 812. The court agreed with "the balance struck" by
the Second Circuit, citing EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298, 302-03 (2d
Cir. 1998) (holding that an arbitration agreement between employee and employer
precluded the EEOC from seeking monetary relief, but not injunctive relief, in federal
court on behalf of the employee). See id. Circuits were split on this issue. See, e.g.,
EEOC v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that a
private arbitration agreement does not preclude the EEOC from seeking monetary
relief in federal court on behalf of an individual).
18. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279 (2002).
19. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyerjoined. Id. at 281.
20. Id. at 288.
21. See id. at 286.
22. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 287-88 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994
ed.)).
23. See id. at 287. The Court also noted two relevant cases decided prior to the
1991 amendments in which the Court recognized the difference between the EEOC's
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2. FAA Analysis
Analyzing the history, purpose, and scope of the FAA, the Court
concluded that the statute did not empower a court to compel arbitration of any issues or parties not covered by agreement. 24 Citing the
FAA purpose to "reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements . . .and to place arbitration agreements upon the
26
25
same footing as other contracts," including employment contracts,
the Court noted that it has interpreted the FAA provisions as "mani27
fest[ing] a 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.'
Nonetheless, the Court specified that when an agreement is unambiguous, the contractual language, not the policy goals of the FAA,
defines the scope of disputes subject to arbitration. 28 Though the
FAA explicitly protects the enforceability of private arbitration agreements, it does not restrict a non-party's choice of a judicial forum nor
does it address the enforceability of arbitration agreements on public
29
agencies.
3. Rejection of Fourth Circuit's Decision
The Court held that although the Fourth Circuit correctly indicated the EEOC's non-party status and independent statutory authority, it erred both in distinguishing between remedies furthering
public and private interests and in giving effect to the FAA rather
public enforcement role and the employee's private cause of action. Id. First, in Occidental Life Insurance Co. of California.v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977), the Court held
that state statutes of limitations did not bar the EEOC from seeking relief on behalf of
an individual. Second, in General Telephone Co. of Northwest v. EEOC, the Court
stated that "the EEOC is not merely a proxy for the victims of discrimination," 446
U.S. 318, 326 (1980), holding that Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did
not bind the EEOC as it would bind a private Title VII class action litigant.
24. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 289.
25. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 289 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991)).
26. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 289 (citing Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,
532 U.S. 105, 121 (2001)). Transportation employees are the single exception to this
policy. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 289.
27. Id. (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
24 (1983)). The FAA provisions interpreted by the Court include the Act's mandate to
federal courts to construe arbitration agreements as "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable." 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2003). Additionally, the FAA authorizes courts to stay proceedings
when an issue arises that is referable to arbitration and to order parties to comply
with their contracted arbitration agreements. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 3-4 (2003). The Court
also cited its recent decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001),
holding that employment contracts, except for transportation workers, are covered by
the FAA. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 289.
28. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 289 (citing Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 57).
29. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 289.
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than analyzing the text of the statutes or arbitration agreement. The
Court noted that because the EEOC only pursues a small number of
claims from a field of thousands of potential suits, 30 the impact of
permitting the EEOC access to victim-specific relief would be minimal. In pursuing victim-specific relief, the agency may be seeking to
serve a public interest. 3 1 Furthermore, Congress authorized the
EEOC to be "master of its own case" and nothing in the text of Title
VII prevented the EEOC from determining the sort of relief it chose
32
to pursue.
Moreover, the Court characterized the Fourth Circuit's policybalancing approach as "inconsistent" with recent arbitration cases
that required courts to determine the scope of the agreement by first
addressing whether the parties agreed to arbitrate rather than by
considering policy goals favoring arbitration. 33 The Court emphasized that while it endorses interpreting ambiguities in favor of arbitration, the plain text of an unambiguous agreement must be
enforced to give effect to the clear intent of the parties. The EEOC
was undisputedly a non-party to the agreement between Baker and
Waffle House, and "[i]t goes without saying that a contract cannot
bind a non-party. '34 The Court concluded that "[t]he proarbitration
policy goals of the FAA do not require the agency to relinquish its
'' 35
statutory authority if it has not agreed to do so.
30.

See id. at 290 n.7. The Court pointed to statistics on the EEOC's website
that
the agency filed less than two percent of all anti-discrimination claims in federal court
in 2000. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 290 n.7 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Enforcement Statistics and Litigation, available at http://
www.eeoc.gov/stats/enforcement.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2003)). The Court reasoned that the small number of suits filed by the EEOC in federal court indicates that
the federal policy favoring arbitration will not be undermined by the EEOC's authority to seek victim-specific relief. See id.
31. See id. at 296.
32. See id. at 291. The Court pointed to the EEOC's enforcement scheme created
by Congress under Title VII in support of its determination that the EEOC is in command of the prosecution process rather than an individual employee. See Waffle
House, 534 U.S. at 291. Once an employee files a claim with the EEOC, the agency
has exclusive jurisdiction over the claim for 180 days. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(1994). During this period, the EEOC investigates the claim and determines whether
there is "reasonable cause" to believe the alleged discrimination occurred. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1994). If the EEOC finds "reasonable cause," it then attempts to
conciliate with the employer before bringing an action against the employer in court.
See id. If the EEOC files suit, the employee may intervene, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(1994), but has no independent cause of action. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 291.
33. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)).
34. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294.
35. Id.

Spring 2003]

Arbitration, Consent and Contractual Theory

295

The Court then added that even if the policy goals of the FAA
supported limiting the EEOC's statutory authority, the Fourth Circuit's distinction between injunctive and victim-specific relief nevertheless created "an uncomfortable fit with its avowed purpose of
'3 6
preserving the EEOC's public function while favoring arbitration.
The Court characterized the Fourth Circuit's victim-specific distinction as "both over-inclusive and under-inclusive," 3 7 explaining that
injunctive relief may address the employee's injury more than any
public interest, and conversely that the EEOC may seek to vindicate
38
a public interest when pursuing victim-specific relief.
4. EEOC's Claim Is Not Derivative
Finally, the majority addressed Waffle House's argument that
employee action might limit the relief the EEOC could obtain in
court. Because Baker had not arbitrated his claim or entered into
settlement negotiations, the court noted that whether a settlement or
arbitration judgment would affect the EEOC's claims or available
remedies was not presented by this case and remains "an open question."39 Though an employee's conduct may affect the EEOC's recov40
ery, this does not make the EEOC's claim "merely derivative.
Pointing to prior decisions, the Court concluded that while "ordinary
principles of res judicata, mootness, or mitigation may apply to
EEOC claims," the agency is not thereby rendered "a proxy for the
'4 1
employee.
C. Dissent
Writing for the dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the Court
should have reconciled the EEOC's statutory authority to enforce the
ADA with the policy goals of the FAA. 42 He criticized the Court's
decision to allow the EEOC to do "on behalf of an employee that
'4 3
which an employee has agreed not to do for himself.
36. Id.
37. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294.
38. See id. at 294-95.
39. Id. at 297.
40. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 297.
41. Id. at 298.
42. See id. at 312-13 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. Id. at 298.
43. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 298 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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In contrast to the majority's conclusion that Title VII grants the
EEOC the right to determine the remedies it pursues, 44 he interpreted that statute to confer on courts, rather than the EEOC, the
role of deciding what is an "appropriate" remedy in a particular
case. 4 5 Here, victim-specific relief was not "appropriate" because
Baker's conduct had limited the EEOC's ability to obtain relief on his
behalf4 6 and because the FAA compels a court to give effect to arbitration agreements. 47 Justice Thomas stated that the majority had
incorrectly framed the issue by focusing on the EEOC's authority
rather than on giving effect to the FAA, thereby "allow[ing] the
EEOC to reduce that arbitration agreement to all but a nullity."4 He
further contended that the Court's decision will discourage employers
from using arbitration agreements because employers may face the
prospect of defending claims in both judicial and arbitral forums. 4 9
As a final point, Justice Thomas raised potential problems for
the Court in deciding future cases consistently with this opinion. If
in a subsequent case the Court were to decide that an employee's unfavorable arbitral judgment affects the remedies available to the
EEOC in court, it would face the "impossible task" of reconciling the
FAA with the result or "mak[ing] a mockery of the Court's holding
50
here: that the EEOC is 'the master of its own case."'
II.
Although the Court in Waffle House reached an appropriate conclusion in light of existing arbitration law, the Court did not enunciate its ruling with sufficient clarity to resolve whether state
44. See id. at 301-02 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 301-02 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas cited language in 42
§ 2000e-5(g)(1) to support this assertion. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 301. The majority refuted this reading by clarifying that the term "appropriate" refers only to a
subcategory of equitable relief claims rather than damages. See id. at 292-93. The
Court stated that the terms the dissent pulled out of the statute were "not the natural
reading of the text" which "obviously refer[s] to the trial judge's discretion in a particular case to order reinstatement and award damages in an amount warranted by the
facts of that case." Id.
46. Id. at 304-05 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas listed the following
situations to illustrate this point: when an employee waives or settles his claim, fails
to mitigate his damages, or fails on the merits of his private suit. See Waffle House,
534 U.S. at 304-05.
47. See id. at 308-09 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 309 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
49. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 309 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 310 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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contractual theories could require a non-signatory to arbitrate without its consent. Not only does the Court not decisively decide the issue, but the brevity of the Court's analysis and reasoning perpetuates
the existing ambiguity. The Court claimed that "no one asserts that
the EEOC is a party to the contract, or that it agreed to arbitrate its
claims," 5 1 thereby implicitly suggesting that Waffle House failed to
mention any theories that could bind the non-signatory EEOC. In
fact, the parties' briefs did specifically raise two contractual theories,
agency and estoppel, in order to argue that the EEOC was a party to
the contract despite being a non-signatory. The Court's statement
seems to indicate that the agency and estoppel theories, even if
proven, would not be a valid basis for finding consent to bind a nonparty to arbitrate. On the one hand, it seems incongruous that the
Court would strike down the use of contractual theories to compel
non-signatories to arbitrate in such an indirect way and with such
inconsequential language. On the other hand, if the Court was willing to accept the use of agency, estoppel, or other contractual theories
to bind a non-signatory, it is unclear why the Court would state that
no such arguments were made despite their explicit advancement in
the briefs.
A. Summary of Background Law
Like one-party 52 and two-party 5 3 methods of dispute resolution,
arbitration pre-dates the formation of government-based adjudication. 54 After centuries of subordination to adjudication, arbitration
reemerged in the late seventeenth century. The legitimacy of arbitration in its reconstituted form was derived from the adjudicatory authority of the state, whose power was derived, in turn, from a social
compact. Arbitration has returned to its origins as a process that derives its authority directly from the consent of the parties such that
51.
52.

Id. at 294.
One-party dispute resolution mechanisms are unilateral solutions based on

the superior power of one party that has the power to force the other side to accept its
resolution.
53. Negotiation is the most common two-party mechanism, so named for the re-

quirement that both sides work together to find an agreeable solution. Some twoparty, third-party hybrids, like mediation, have also regained popularity in recent
years.
54.

See Tibor Varady, The Standing of Arbitration Within the Legal System, in

& REALITY: ESSAYS ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURAL LAW 351 (Mathilde Sumampouw et al. eds., 1995), reprinted in TIBOR VARADY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: A TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 41, 41 (2d ed.
LAw

1999).
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any arbitration that occurs outside without such consent is illegitimate and invalid.5 5 Consent has thereby reemerged as the foundational notion upon which the entire arbitration regime is built: "a
party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which
'56
he has not agreed so to submit.
In deciding whether a party has submitted a particular dispute
to arbitration, state contract law applies. 57 The question is therefore
what actions are sufficient indicia of consent, since the federal policy
in favor of arbitration does not apply until the jurisdiction of the tribunal has been established.58 Although agreements to arbitrate
"must not be so broadly construed as to encompass claims and parties
that were not intended by the original contract," 59 many lower courts
have concluded that "[i]t does not follow ... that under the Federal
Arbitration Act an obligation to arbitrate attaches only to one who
has personally signed the written arbitration provision." 60 Courts
have converged on five contractual theories that may be applied to
require arbitration by non-signatories or, conversely, to allow nonsignatories to intervene in or compel arbitration: incorporation by
55. While arbitration still relies upon the state for post-award enforcement, as
well as assistance where required in tribunal formation and discovery, arbitration is
generally conceived of as an extra-judicial process aligned with no state. This conception, in turn, reinforces the minimal role of the courts in arbitrated disputes. See, e.g.,
In re Application of Technostroyexport, 853 F.Supp. 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (allowing
discovery only when requested by the tribunal itself, not the parties). This creates a
positive feedback loop in which arbitration becomes an even more clearly extra-judicial process.
56. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574,
582 (1960); see also Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior
Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989) (finding that the FAA "does not require parties to
arbitrate when they have not agreed to do so."). However, courts will read an ambiguous choice-of-law provision to favor arbitration. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995).
57. See First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995).
58. See id. at 944-45.
59. Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995).
60. Id. Virtually every circuit has recognized this principle, to some extent. See
Hilti, Inc. v. Oldach, 392 F.2d 368, 369 n.2 (1st Cir. 1968); Interocean Shipping Co. v.
Nat'l Shipping & Training Corp., 523 F.2d 527, 539 (2d Cir. 1975); Barrowclough v.
Kidder, Peabody & Co., 752 F.2d 923, 938 (3d Cir. 1985); Maxum Founds., Inc. v.
Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 978 (4th Cir. 1985); Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Gaskamp,
280 F.3d 1069, 1074 (5th Cir. 2002) (applying Texas state law); Javitch v. First Union
Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d. 619, 629 (6th Cir. 2003); In re Oil Spill by Amoco Cadiz, 659 F.2d
789, 795-96 (7th Cir. 1981); Letizia v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 802 F.2d 1185,
1187-88 (9th Cir. 1986); Gibson v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc., 181 F.3d 1163, 1170 n.3 (10th
Cir. 1999); Sunkist Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 756-57
(11th Cir. 1993).
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reference, assumption, agency, veil-piercing, and estoppel. 6 1 Predictably, courts facing motions to compel divide not only over arbitral
law, but also over differences in and implications of state contract
law.
B. Incorporationby Reference
Incorporation by reference allows parties to incorporate the
terms of an earlier agreement, which may or may not be between the
same parties, without a redundant recitation of the terms, for example, where subcontractors are being bound to the contract between
the owner and contractor, or where parties are renewing an earlier
contract. While this is an accepted practice in contract law, some
parties have challenged incorporation of an embedded arbitration
clause.
The First, 6 2 Second, 6 3 Fourth, 6 4 and Sixth 6 5 Circuits have held
that an arbitration clause may be incorporated by reference, even
where the incorporated contract merely adopted the arbitration
61. See Thompson-CSF, 63 F.3d at 776 (summarizing its acceptance of "five theories for binding nonsignatories to arbitration agreements: 1) incorporation by reference; 2) assumption; 3) agency; 4) veil-piercing/alter ego; and 5) estoppel."); see also
Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, Enforcement of Arbitration Agreement Contained in
Construction Contract By or Against Nonsignatory, 100 A.L.R. 5th 481 (2002) (discussing third-party beneficiary, agency and employment, equitable estoppel, statutory construction, and procedural reasons for compelling arbitration by nonsignatories).
62. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 992 F.2d 386, 388-89 (1st
Cir. 1993) (holding that a chain may be established whereby each contract adopts by
incorporation an arbitration clause expressly stated or incorporated into the incorporated contract's terms); J & S Const. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 520 F.2d 809, 810
(1st Cir. 1975) (allowing third-party surety to compel arbitration where the arbitration clause of a construction contract was incorporated by reference in its contract
with the general contractor).
63. See Thyssen, Inc. v. Calypso Shipping Co., 310 F.3d 102, 107-08 (2d Cir. 2002)
(holding that parties are bound to arbitrate where a bill of lading incorporates an
arbitration clause of another contract by reference).
64. See Kvaerner ASA v. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi, Ltd., New York Branch, 210
F.3d 262, 266-67 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that terms of arbitration clause were incorporated by reference in a subsequent contract with the third party, thereby binding
all parties to arbitrate disputes arising out of and related to construction agreement);
Maxum Founds., Inc. v. Salus Corp., 779 F.2d 974, 978-79 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding an
arbitration provision was incorporated by reference into a subcontract), appeal after
remand 817 F.2d 1086, 1087-88 (4th Cir. 1987) (noting a circuit split as to whether
federal courts may order consolidation of arbitration proceedings without consent by
the parties, but holding that the terms of the contracts evinced an intent to consolidate and therefore ordering a consolidation of the arbitration proceedings).
65. See Exchange Mut. Ins. Co. v. Haskell Co., 742 F.2d 274 (6th Cir. 1984).
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clause by reference to an even earlier contract. In addition, international arbitral tribunals have readily recognized the validity of incorporation by reference, 66 since it meets the strict written requirement
67
of the New York Convention.
In contrast, the Eighth Circuit has adopted an opposite approach, rejecting incorporation by reference, in whole or in part, as a
basis for compelling arbitration against non-signatories. 68 This outcome is consistent with the view that incorporation by reference may
not serve the cautionary function of formality, 69 given that the parties may be unaware of the embedded arbitration clause, and may
intend to refer merely to the substantive obligations of the earlier
contract. 70 This concern is especially pertinent given that the separability doctrine recognizes the initial contract and the later contract
as two separate contracts. 7 1 Separability suggests that courts should
not impose on the parties any obligations they did not clearly intend
to assume, in light of the requirement that the existence of arbitration clauses be strictly construed.
66. See, e.g., United Nations Comm'n on Int'l Trade, Model Law on Int'l Commercial Arbitration of 1985, Art. 7(2), available at http://www.uncitral.org/englishltexts/
arbitration/ml-arb/htm (last visited Mar. 5, 2003) ("The reference in a contract to a
document containing an arbitration clause constitutes an arbitration agreement provided that the contract is in writing and the reference is such as to make that clause
part of the contract.").
67. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards (New York Convention of 1958), availableat http://www.uncitral.org/
english/texts/arbitrationNY-conv.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003). The New York Convention forms the basis of international arbitrations, as it provides an international
enforcement mechanism for arbitral awards that exceeds the enforcement available
for adjudicated awards. The widespread acceptance of the Convention, which has
over 100 signatories, has resulted in a harmonization of domestic laws governing enforcement. However, resistance to the New York Convention's requirement that an
arbitration agreement be in writing in order to qualify for the protections of the Convention has emerged, as demonstrated by Article 7 of the United Nations Comm'n on
Int'l Trade Model Law on Int'l Commercial Arbitration of 1985 and Article 1(2) of the
European (Geneva) Convention of Int'l Commercial Arbitration of 1961, available at
http://www.asser.nl/ica/eur.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2003).
68. See AgGrow Oils, L.L.C. v. Nat'l. Union Fire Ins. Co., 242 F.3d 777, 782 (8th
Cir. 2001).
69. For a discussion of the roles of formality, see Arthur T. von Mehren, CivilLaw Analogues to Consideration:An Exercise in ComparativeAnalysis, 72 HARv. L.
REV. 1009, 1015-17 (1959).
70. See, e.g., AgGrow Oils, 242 F.3d at 781 (explaining that "an incorporation
clause is effective only when the provision to which reference is made has a reasonably clear and ascertainable meaning.") (internal citations omitted) (quoting JS&H
Constr. Co. v. Richmond County Hosp. Auth., 473 F.2d 212, 215 (5th Cir. 1973)).
71. See Prima Paint v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-07 (1967)
(holding that allegations of fraud in the contract do not undermine the arbitrability of
the dispute).
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Veil Piercing

Veil piercing 72 is distinguishable from other methods of compelling arbitration in that it focuses not on a non-signatory's actions, but
instead on the nature of the relationship between the non-signatory
and a party. It is the only theory that binds a non-signatory to arbitrate despite the possibility that the non-signatory is unaware of the
agreement and did not participate in its formation. There is some
disparity between circuits in the application of veil piercing to arbitration agreements. However, these differences often reflect distinctive features of the underlying state contract law, rather than a true
disagreement between the circuits. 73 Indeed, the courts of appeals
that have addressed the issue uniformly accept the general principle
that a court may pierce the corporate veil for liability purposes when
the two entities are significantly intertwined because one may presume that the parent entity had the power to influence the arbitra74
tion clause.
D. Agency
Circuits are widely divided on the proper application of agency
theory7 5 to arbitration clauses. 76 The Third Circuit has concluded
that agents of a signatory may be bound, along with its employees
72. Veil piercing is a term drawn from corporate law, describing where a corporation and another entity, whether a living person or corporation, can be held liable as
one transactional unit. The elements of veil piercing are typically characterized by a
lack of separateness or commingling and unfair or inequitable conduct.
73. See Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency, 210 F.3d 524, 535-37 (5th Cir. 2000)
(discussing courts of appeals' holdings, applicability of state law in the veil piercing
context); see also Semiconductor Energy Lab. Co. v. Samsung Elecs. Am., No. 97-1217,
1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 15005 (Fed. Cir. June 23, 1997) (suggesting that the Federal
Circuit would entertain a veil piercing basis for arbitration but resolving the matter
on other grounds).
74. See Beiser v. Weyler, 284 F.3d 665 (5th Cir. 2002); E.I. DuPont de Nemours
and Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, S.A.S., 269 F.3d. 187 (3d Cir.
2001); Smith/Enron Cogeneration Ltd. Partnership, Inc. v. Smith Cogeneration Int'l,
198 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 1999); Freeman v. Complex Computing Co., 119 F.3d 1044 (2d
Cir. 1997); Nordell Intern. Res. Ltd. v. Triton Oil, 97 F.3d 1460 (9th Cir. 1996); United
Intern. Holdings, Inc. v. Wharf (Holdings) Ltd., 76 F.3d 393 (10th Cir. 1996); Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773 (2d Cir. 1995); ARW Exploration
Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1995); Fisser v. Int'l Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d
Cir. 1960).
75. An agency relationship is a "fiduciary relationship which results from the
manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1958). Liability to a third party may accrue to the principal where the agent had real or apparent authority, or "the agent had a power arising
from the agency relation and not dependent upon authority or apparent authority."
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and representatives. 7 7 In contrast, the First, 78 Fifth, 79 and Ninth8 °
Circuits have held that an agent or employee of a party is not privileged to enforce an arbitration clause, unless the parties specifically
intended for the clause to reach to these non-signatories.
Courts have often looked to whether the principal is disclosed or
undisclosed, generally finding that where the principal is disclosed,
signing the arbitration agreement is insufficient to bind the agent.8
Where the principle is undisclosed, courts may follow the lead of international arbitration and bind the agent to the clause. However,
the Fourth Circuit has suggested that where a party signs an arbitration agreement with an agent, either the agent or the principal may
compel arbitration, even where the existence of a principal is not
82
disclosed.
Id. at § 140. However, even where a principal is not subject to liability under principles of agency, there may be a basis in estoppel, restitution or negotiability for finding
liability. See id. at § 141.
Where an agency relationship is disclosed or partially disclosed, the principal is
deemed to be the party if his name appears as such within the contract, and there is
no indication within the contract to the contrary. See id. at § 155. However, where
the principal is undisclosed, agency law does not provide a decisive rule: "An undisclosed principal may be liable upon a simple contract in writing, although it purports
to be the contract of the agent." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 190 (1958).
76. See, e.g., Westmoreland v. Sadoux, 299 F.3d 462 (5th Cir. 2002); E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co. v. Rhone Poulenc Fiber & Resin Intermediates, SAS, 269 F.3d 187
(3d Cir. 2001); Long v. Silver, 248 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2001); Bel-Ray Co. v. Chemrite,
181 F.3d 435 (3d Cir. 1999); Andersons, Inc. v. Horton Farms, Inc., 166 F.3d 308 (6th
Cir. 1998); Harrison v. Eddy Potash, Inc., 112 F.3d 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); McCarthy v.
Azure, 22 F.3d 351 (1st Cir. 1994); Britton v. Co-op Banking Group, 4 F.3d 742 (9th
Cir. 1993); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d
Cir. 1993); Flink v. Carlson, 856 F.2d 44 (8th Cir. 1988); Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826
F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1987); Seguros Banvenez, S.A. v. S/S Oliver Drescher, 761 F.2d 855
(2d Cir. 1985); Interocean Ship. Co. v. Nat'l Ship. & Trading Corp., 462 F.2d 673 (2d
Cir. 1972); Fisser v. Int'l Bank, 282 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1960).
77. See Pritzker, 7 F.3d 1110.
78. See McCarthy, 22 F.3d at 356.
79. See Westmoreland, 299 F.3d at 465.
80. See Britton, 4 F.3d at 749.
81. See, e.g., McCarthy, 22 F.3d at 361 (citing Flink v. Carlson, 856 F.2d 44, 46;
Interocean Ship. Co. v. Nat'l Shipping & Trading Corp., 523 F.2d 527, 538; Dun Shipping Ltd. v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 234 F.Supp 2d. 291, 294-96 (SDNY, 2002);
Habitat Architectural Group, P.A. v. Capitol Lodging Corp., 28 Fed.Appx. 242, 245-46
(4th Cir. 2002)).
82. See Habitat Architectural Group, P.A. v. Capitol Lodging Corp., 28 Fed.
Appx. 242, 245-46 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding signatory plaintiff is compelled to arbitrate
claims against the undisclosed principal because ambiguity is construed against the
drafter, the state has a strong public policy in favor of arbitration, and state contract
law finds that either the principal or agent may sue where an undisclosed agency
relationship exists).
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E. Assumption
Assumption is a corollary to a party's submission to a court's jurisdiction in adjudication. A party may be bound by its indication of a
willingness to participate in arbitration such that it is precluded from
subsequently challenging the jurisdiction of the arbitrators.8 3 For example, the Second Circuit has ordered parties to arbitrate where they
send a representative to participate in the arbitration.8 4 However,
there is a risk that parties are not aware of which step in the arbitral
process signifies consent.8 5
The decision to recognize assumption turns on the court's conception of the purposes of contract. On the one hand, allowing assumption may permit a party to slip unknowingly and unintentionally into
a purported agreement to arbitrate despite the absence of a meeting
of the minds. On the other hand, refusing to recognize assumption
makes parties susceptible to relying on an opposing party's bad faith
indication of willingness to participate in arbitration. 6 While most
courts have interpreted the pro-arbitration policy of the FAA as indicating that courts should attempt to construe arbitration agreements
liberally to bring the maximum number of parties into arbitration,
this policy does not hold drafters accountable for meeting a sufficient
level of diligence in drafting arbitration clauses.
F. Estoppel
Estoppel claims in contract differ in a nuanced way from estoppel
in the context of compelling arbitration.8 7 Some courts have not distinguished between estoppel and assumption, preferring to subsume
83. See Gvozdenovic v. United Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1991)
(providing a clear example of the assumption principle).
84.

See id.

85. For example, there is a question of whether merely interviewing arbitrators
is sufficient, or whether one must select an arbitrator and arrive for at least the first
day of testimony.
86. Clearly the easiest route for practitioners ex ante is to memorialize the intent
to arbitrate at the time it is manifested by both parties, rather than attempting to
prove intent ex post. Nevertheless, these claims remain common in the courts, perhaps because of a concern by practitioners that raising the issue of creating a written
arbitration agreement will chill willingness to explore arbitration or be interpreted as
mistrust by the opposing counsel. Ironically, it is those cases in which one party
would not have been willing to become contractually obligated to arbitrate that are
the most problematic for the requirement of consent.
87. See Grigson v. Creative Artists Agency L.L.C., 210 F.3d 524, 531 (5th Cir.
2000) (Dennis, J., dissenting). In disagreeing with the use of estoppel in establishing
an arbitration agreement, Judge Dennis stated:
'[N]early anything can be called estoppel. When a lawyer or a judge does not
know what other name to give for his decision to decide a case in a certain
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both within a broader definition of estoppel. Those courts that distinguish between these two bases for compelling non-signatory arbitration have used estoppel for situations in which a party to a lawsuit
must rely on the existence of a contract in order to prove its claim.
The litigants are thereby precluded from alleging that they are not
parties to the contract and its arbitration clause. The estoppel argument is most often raised where the non-signatory plaintiff relies on
the existence of a contract that contains an arbitration clause in order to prove its claim against a signatory. However, this has also
been applied in the less common situation of a signatory relying on a
contract containing an arbitration clause to assert claims against a
non-signatory.8 8
The Eleventh Circuit has held that a non-signatory can compel
arbitration where the signatory's claims rely on the existence of the
contract containing the arbitration clause. It has also held that
where a signatory is raising claims against both a fellow signatory
and a non-party, the non-signatory may compel arbitration where the
claims are "substantially interdependent."8 9 The Fourth Circuit has
applied a similar test holding that "[w]hen the charges against a parent company and its subsidiary are based on the same facts and are
inherently inseparable, a court may refer claims against the parent
to arbitration even though the parent is not formally a party to the
arbitration agreement." 90

way, he says there is an estoppel.' The trouble with that kind of use of the
estoppel label by the majority in this case making circuit precedent is that it
will seriously hinder this court in upholding the basic principle that a person
has a right to a court's decision about the merits of a dispute unless he has
agreed to submit it to arbitration.
Id. at 531 (5th Cir. 2000) (Dennis, J., dissenting) (quoting Samuel Williston, 4 A.L.I.
PROC. 61, 89-90 (1926) (quoted in 4 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 8.5
(4th ed.1992))).
88. See, e.g., Hughes Masonry Co., Inc. v. Greater Clark County, 659 F.2d 836
(7th Cir. 1981) (holding that a signatory was obligated to arbitrate where its claimed
breach of contract by a party it alleged was a non-signatory, as these two positions
were found to be logically inconsistent by the court).
89. MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999). This
test has also been adopted by the Fifth Circuit. See Grigson, 210 F.3d at 527.
90. J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 320-21
(4th Cir. 1993). J.J.Ryan is further indicative of the indistinguishable line in some
circuits between veil piercing and the more general category of equitable estoppel,
discussed supra in Part II.C. See id.
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III.
Even after the Supreme Court's decision in Waffle House, the
state of the law regarding compelling non-signatories to arbitrate remains ambiguous because of the continued presence of persuasive arguments on both sides of the issue.
A.

The Case for Binding Non-Signatories

There are two primary reasons why lower federal courts still
might continue compelling arbitration based on non-signatory theories after Waffle House. First, the Supreme Court did not directly
overrule this pervasive practice. 9 1 While the Court explicitly stated
that "[i]t goes without saying that a contract cannot bind a nonparty,"9 2 the Court says nothing more on the matter. It seems unlikely that the Court would overrule such an established precedent
with only a few sentences that do not specifically reference any of the
extensive non-signatory case law. Moreover, though the Court need
not expressly state its intention to overrule this case law, it would
probably not do so without referring to the practice or without even
mentioning the term "non-signatory."
A second argument that non-signatories may still be bound to
arbitrate is that the Court may have intended for Waffle House to
have a narrow holding, applicable only to cases involving a relationship between a federal agency and arbitration. For instance, after
characterizing the effects of settlement on a similar claim as "an open
question," the Court reiterated: "The only issue before this Court is
whether the fact that Baker has signed a mandatory arbitration
agreement limits the remedies available to the EEOC.

'9 3

It is signifi-

cant that the Court framed the issue as whether a specific agency,
91. In light of the Supreme Court's failure in the Waffle House opinion to explicitly overrule the practice of compelling non-signatories to arbitrate claims, courts
have distinguished the holding and continued to consider non-signatory theories. For
example, in a recent First Circuit case, Medical Air Tech. Corp. v. Marwan Inv., Inc.,
303 F.3d 11, 18 (2002) the court.cited Waffle House for the general rule that "a contract cannot bind a non-party" but stated there are exceptions to the rule, such as the
estoppel theory. In another case, Gambardella v. Pentec, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 237,
242 (D. Conn. 2002), the court distinguished Waffle House as addressing only situations in which non-signatories are compelled to arbitrate and not cases where the
non-signatory is compelling a party to arbitrate. The Gambardella court cited Choctaw GenerationLtd. P'ship. v. American Home Assurance Co., 271 F.3d 403, 406 (2d
Cir. 2001) as noting the distinction between these situations and concluded that Waffle House "does not alter this analysis." Gambardella,218 F. Supp. 2d at 242.
92. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294.
93. Id. at 297.

306

Harvard Negotiation Law Review

[Vol. 8:289

the EEOC, was limited in possible remedies and not whether the
class of non-parties more generally could be compelled to arbitrate.
A structural analysis of the Waffle House opinion also supports
94
the hypothesis. The Court divided its opinion into five sections,
none of which explicitly focus on the non-signatory issue and most of
which are devoted to describing the operation of the EEOC and its
statutory authority. Notably, the Court did not begin with an analysis of whether the EEOC could be compelled to arbitrate, but rather
examined Title VII as the source of the EEOC's enforcement authority. Even when the Court considered whether the EEOC's claim was
derivative, the analysis was grounded in the EEOC's unique status
given its statutorily proscribed function and available remedies. 9 5 By
describing the EEOC's role as a non-party "in command of the process" and as "the master of its own case,"9 6 but failing to address the
non-signatory issue directly, the Court distinguished the EEOC from
private litigants. 9 7 Under this narrow interpretation, arguing that
the Waffle House holding precludes courts from applying contractual
theories to all non-signatories would require a tenuously broad
reading.
B. Arguing Against Binding Non-Parties
In the wake of Waffle House, counsel and courts alike have a
strong basis for arguing that a non-party9" cannot be compelled to
94. The first section is devoted to the facts and procedural history, the second
analyzes Title VII and the function of the EEOC, the third focuses on the FAA and
subsequent court interpretations thereof, the fourth reviews the Fourth Circuit's decision, and the fifth addresses the "open question" of whether settlement or other action
by the employee would affect the outcome. See Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 279.
95. See id. at 288. In its examination of cases prior to the 1991 amendments to
Title VII, the Court pointed to its recognition in these cases of the difference between
the EEOC's role as an enforcement agency and the individual employee's cause of
action. See id. While this suggests the Court recognized the EEOC's claim was nonderivative, the Court finished this line of analysis with a conclusion harkening back to
its focus on remedies: "There is no language in the statute or in either of these cases
suggesting that the existence of an arbitration agreement between private parties
materially changes the EEOC's statutory function or the remedies that are otherwise
available." Id.
96. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 291.
97. For example, the Court states "If it were true that the EEOC could prosecute
its claim only with Baker's consent, or if its prayer for relief could be dictated by
Baker, the court's analysis might be persuasive. But once a charge is filed, the exact
opposite is true under the statute-the EEOC is in command of the process." Waffle
House, 534 U.S. at 291.
98. The term non-signatory as used in this discussion is exclusive of parties
merely standing in place of the signatory, through a derivative claim, since it is wellestablished that a party may not pass to another a claim stronger than that which he
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arbitrate in the absence of consent. The Court expressly declared
that "[a]rbitration under the [FAA] is a matter of consent, not coerIt goes without saying that a contract cannot bind a noncion ....
party." 99 Even though it is unusual that the Court did not include
further discussion or analysis, the statement is clear on its face. This
recognition is further buttressed by an understanding of the context
in which the Court made the statement as it demonstrates a concerted intention to reign in the lower courts' willingness to compel
non-signatory arbitration.
First, the Supreme Court was not making a radical departure
from its past opinions. Instead, it was merely re-affirming consent as
a long-standing tenet of arbitration, upon which the entire arbitral
framework depends on for legitimacy, and thus may not have found a
lengthy analysis to be necessary. 10 0 While First Options mandates
that courts apply state law contract principles to determine whether
parties agreed to arbitrate, this is limited by the requirement that
there must be "clear and unmistakable evidence" that the parties
agreed to arbitrate. 10 1 Since this was framed as a "qualification" to
the application of state law, it sets a minimum threshold rather than
has. Thus, an individual who has signed an arbitration clause cannot avoid the
clause by agreeing with another to be indemnified, such that the claim passes to the
indemnifier absent the forum selection clause, since this would dramatically undermine the entire arbitration regime.
99. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294.
100. See, e.g., Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 469 (1989) (holding that "Arbitration under the Act in a matter of consent, not coercion"); Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 20 (1983) (holding that a
party cannot be compelled to arbitrate where it has not consented to do so, even
though related claims against another party were subject to an arbitration agreement
and would thus create two competing forums).
101. When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a certain matter (including arbitrability), courts generally (though with a qualification we discuss below)
should apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the formation of contracts. The
relevant state law here, for example, would require the court to see whether the parties objectively revealed an intent to submit the arbitrability issue to arbitration.
This Court, however, has (as we just said) added an important qualification,
applicable when courts decide whether a party has agreed that arbitrators
should decide arbitrability: Courts should not assume that the parties agreed
to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is 'clea[r] and unmistakabl[el' evidence
that they did so. In this manner the law treats silence or ambiguity about the
question 'who (primarily) should decide arbitrability' differently from the
way it treats silence or ambiguity about the question 'whether a particular
merits-related dispute is arbitrable because it is within the scope of a valid
arbitration agreement' for in respect to this latter question the law reverses
the presumption.
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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allowing any contract theory to apply. Such an interpretation is in
harmony with the theory that consent is the basis for compelling
arbitration.
In contrast, modern theories binding non-signatories do not
evince such close connections to consent. For example, in veil piercing, a party is bound by the consent of another. While a party may
have a close enough relationship with another to be liable for its actions, courts rarely find two parties sufficiently related that one may
waive another's due process rights-yet an analogous event occurs
here through the forum selection clause. Similarly, under an agency
theory, parties can conceivably be obligated to arbitrate with an unknown party, with whom they could not possibly have manifested
consent to arbitrate. Thus, while courts should look to state law in
determining the existence of an arbitration contract, where its formation is not based on a clear and unmistakable intent to consent to
arbitrate this dispute with these parties, then the contract does not
evince the consent required to form an arbitration contract. Indeed,
many of the courts that have found these contractual theories suitable proxies for consent have also relied on Mitsubishi'sgeneral policy
favoring arbitration, 1 02 even though First Options explicitly states
that such a presumption applies only to the scope of an agreement,
10 3
not its existence.
Second, there is evidence that the Court was aware of the expansion by lower courts of the reach of arbitration agreements to nonparties. Indeed, it had repeatedly denied certiorari in similar
cases.' 0 4 Moreover, in their submissions to the Court, both parties
explicitly raised the issue of whether a non-party may be bound by an

102.

See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 US 614

(1985).
103. See, e.g., Arnold v. Arnold Corp, 920 F.2d 1269 (6th Cir. 1990).
104. See Dayhoff Inc. v. H.J. Heinz Co., 86 F.3d 1287, 1297 (3d Cir. 1996) (held
that a non-signatory parent corporation cannot "by reason of their corporate relationship" enforce an arbitration clause, signed by a wholly-owned subsidiary, absent an
express agreement to that effect), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1028 (1996); Sunkist Soft
Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 757 (11th Cir. 1993) (compelling

arbitration where signatory was acquired by a corporation which assumed all the signatory's obligations, under a theory of equitable estoppel), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 869

(1994); Gvozdenovic v. United Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d 1100, 1105 (2d Cir. 1991) (assumption by conduct sufficient), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 910 (1991); Interocean Ship-

ping Co. v. Nat'l Shipping & Trading Corp., 523 F.2d 527, 539 (2d Cir. 1975) (holding
that an alter ego of the signatory may be obligated to arbitrate, but that this obligation is highly limited), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976).
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agreement. 10 5 In its brief, Waffle House made an estoppel argument,
although it did not label it as such: "The federal courts consistently
refuse to allow circumvention of arbitration agreements through litigation that, while nominally brought by a third party, is in reality for
the benefit of the party who has agreed to arbitrate."'10 6 The EEOC
responded by framing the question as one of consent, relying on the
Court's jurisprudence that a party could not be compelled to arbitrate
when it has not agreed to do so. 10 7 In an impressive move, the EEOC
argued the binding of non-parties issue in terms not of estoppel, but
of agency. The EEOC then argued that it was not an agent of the
signatory employee.' 0 8 Since earlier petitions for certiorari and both
parties' briefs had brought this issue to the Court's attention, the
Court must have understood the effects that proclaiming a non-party
could not be bound by a contract would have on forcing non-signatories to arbitrate.
Third, the Court did not casually make the statement that nonparties may not be bound by the arbitration agreement, but applied
the principle specifically to the fact situation of Waffle House. In its
analysis, the Court determined that one could only be bound to arbitrate if it is a party to the contract or if it agreed to arbitrate. In so

105. See Resp. Brief, Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279 (2002) (No. 99-1823), availablein
2001 WL 799217, at *32; Reply Brief, Waffle House (No. 99-1823), available in 2001
WL 930610, at *12.
106. Resp. Brief, Waffle House (No. 99-1823), available in 2001 WL 799217, at *10.
107. See Reply Brief, Waffle House (No. 99-1823), availablein 2001 WL 930610, at
*10-11.
The operative provision of the FAA simply provides that agreements to arbitrate 'shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.' 9 U.S.C. 2. The
FAA, 'as a whole, is at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual arrangements.' Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-

Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985). Accordingly, 'just as [a party] has
no obligation to arbitrate issues which it has not agreed to arbitrate, so a
fortiori, it cannot be compelled to arbitrate if an arbitration clause does not
bind it at all.' John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547
(1964). See also AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S.

643, 648 (1986) ('party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit') (citation omitted). The EEOC
has never entered into a private contractual arrangement with respondent.
The FAA's 'pro-arbitration policy' (Resp. Br. 18), therefore, does not impose
any limitation on an EEOC public enforcement action.
Id.
108.

See id.
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doing, the court specifically stated that "no one" has alleged that either of these criteria has been met and it therefore "goes without saying" that the agency was not compelled to arbitrate. 10 9 Yet, because
Waffle House raised an estoppel argument in its brief, this sentence
implies that estoppel cannot be used as a theory to bind non-signatories. Furthermore, such a finding comports with the fundamental
principle that, without agreeing to the original clause or exhibiting
subsequent intention to be bound, a non-signatory such as the EEOC
could not have provided consent to arbitration. Indeed, the EEOC's
only connection to the arbitration clause was its reliance on the
container employment contract in establishing its claim.
An attempt to read the Waffle House discussion of non-parties
and consent as not precluding certain state theories for finding a contract leaves an unanswered question: If the Court did not intend to
invalidate non-signatory theories, why did it not explicitly analyze
whether any of the theories applied to the EEOC before dismissing
the motion to compel arbitration? Where such theories are valid, the
court would have to assess whether the party is a signatory, and if
not, whether there is an alternative basis for binding the party under
state contract law.
IV.
The issue presented by Waffle House was, at its core, whether
non-signatories like the EEOC can be compelled to arbitrate and, if
so, under what conditions. The Court answered, albeit briefly, that a
court should undertake a multi-step analysis: first, determine
whether the entity resisting arbitration is a party; then, if the entity
is a non-party, determine whether there has been a manifestation of
consent. If a non-signatory theory is to have any power post-Waffle
House, it must therefore establish either that the subject is a party or
that it has consented to arbitrate. Such a reading would comport
with the plain language and analytical method of the Court. Furthermore, because this interpretation does not completely preclude
binding non-signatories, but merely reinforces the existing requirements of the FAA and the underlying principles of arbitration, it
makes the Court's light treatment of the issue appear consistent with
the significance of the holding.
All five contractual non-signatory theories-agency, veil piercing, estoppel, assumption and incorporation by reference-are impacted differently by a strict return to the party-status or consent
109.
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regime asserted by Waffle House. Agency is likely to continue to play
a dominant role in establishing party status, as it will inform the determination of the obligations which accrue when an independent
agent represents a disclosed or undisclosed principle. Veil piercing
may be limited after Waffle House, however. It is problematic to argue that veil piercing establishes party status because veil piercing is
not a contractual theory, but rather it allows one to pierce the corporate veil for the purpose of liability. That being the case, it would
also be difficult to use veil piercing to argue that the controlling entity actually consented to arbitration. Nevertheless, estoppel may
have been weakened the most dramatically, as reliance on the existence of a contract alone is not a sufficient basis to argue that an
entity is a party to a contract. Indeed, in Waffle House, the EEOC's
claim rested on the existence of the employment contract, yet that did
not make it a party to the litigation, nor was it evidence of implied
consent to arbitrate. In contrast, assumption implicates the consent
requirement, since the actions of an individual are purported to
evince a willingness to submit to arbitration even if the party later
decides not to arbitrate. In essence, this is the same question asked
in any consent inquiry: Were the actions of the parties sufficient to
constitute consent to arbitration despite the lack of a contractual
agreement? As such, assumption theories will probably continue to
apply post-Waffle House, although their value may be limited. Finally, unlike the other non-signatory theories, incorporation by reference deals with the substance of the contract, rather than whether an
entity is a party or has otherwise consented to arbitrate. There is no
evidence to suggest that Waffle House has limited this theory, since it
turns on whether a state should recognize a particular type of
contract.
In conclusion, the conflict between the meaning of the language
of Waffle House when read in isolation and its meaning when read in
context renders the holding unclear. For this reason, courts are
likely to continue their practices of applying contract law theories to
bind non-signatories to arbitration. While consent has long served as
the fundamental, irreducible quality of party-initiated arbitration,
the variations in interpreting party-status based on state law theories undermine the legitimacy of arbitration. Historically courts
were required to find consent that met the threshold requirements of
the FAA, however, the current line of jurisprudence has increasingly
allowed contractual theories to overshadow consent. Circuits are
now reaching so far as to imply consent based on the existence of a
contract, even though the contractual theory itself may not require
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actual consent to, or even knowledge of, the arbitration agreement.
Rather than permitting the evisceration of consent, courts should
again look for a real, rather than implied, consent to arbitration, as
required by the core principles underlying arbitration, the FAA, and
the long-standing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court.

